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BEFORE NEXT TIME: THE CONTINUED
EVOLUTION OF STATUTORY RESPONSES TO
MASS FATALITY INCIDENTS
Trudy Henson
Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), U.S. states
relied upon presumptive death statutes to issue death certificates when
remains could not be found.' These statutes permitted the issuance of
presumptive death certificates to a proper petitioner after a statutorily-
defined period of time, typically five to seven years. Many U.S. states also
allowed petitioners to request death certificates if the petitioner could prove
the presumed dead had been exposed to a "specific peril"-such as being at
sea during a major storm. 2 Even before 9/11, however, mass fatality events
overwhelmed local resources. Events such as airplane crashes led many to
question the efficacy of the identification and issuance process, particularly
where searches for survivors had ceased, and, in the case of airplane crashes,
flight manifests clearly identified passengers on board-arguably making it
less uncertain whether a presumptive death certificate was appropriate.
Even before September 11, mass fatalities occurred often enough to raise
concerns about the ability of localities to promptly handle multiple deaths.
The September 11 attacks brought this issue into national focus as New
York City worked to respond to the largest foreign attack on U.S. soil, and
other affected states looked for ways to ease the burden on families and
survivors impacted by the attacks. In the immediate aftermath of September
11, four overwhelmed U.S. states realized their current presumptive death
statutes did not contemplate a mass fatality event or were not equipped to
handle multiple deaths with unrecovered remains. The result was a number
of extraordinary and temporary measures to streamline the process for
issuing presumptive death certificates to next of kin. Several years later,
Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana, and legislators found themselves
implementing a similar solution to a familiar problem. In reaction to
incidents in the decade that followed September 11, including the 2004
Indian Ocean Tsunami, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, and the 2011
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster in Japan, other U.S. states, as well
as other countries and international organizations, re-evaluated and
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1701 (2007).
2. See id.
7
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expanded their respective presumptive death processes to better address
deaths arising from mass fatality incidents.
This evolution in statutory response is intended to ease the administrative
burden on both surviving family members and overwhelmed government
agencies by reducing administrative burdens and helping to speed the
delivery of benefits for survivors of missing persons. Although federal
oversight encourages mass fatality planning, and states are generally well-
equipped to handle mass fatalities, issuing death certificates in a mass
fatality scenario poses unique problems often unanticipated by mass fatality
management plans and specific peril statutes. Statutes adopted after 9/11 are
no exception. This Note seeks to examine and evaluate whether the changes
in statutory responses effectively address the matters of missing persons and
presumptions of death. First, it will address the difficulties of handling a
mass fatality generally and then examine the legal practice surrounding
death. It will then examine presumptive death certificates and specific peril
statutes, particularly when used for mass fatalities, and compare several
states' post-9/11 enactments to discuss the relative merits of each.
Following this examination and evaluation, this Note highlights areas of
concern and makes recommendations for further changes in statutory
responses to mass fatalities.
I. MASS DISASTERS AND FATALITIES GENERALLY
While response to a mass disaster has always been important,
management of mass fatalities specifically commands increasing attention
from the treatment of victim remains to the treatment of surviving family
members. The shift in focus is the result of hard-learned lessons from mass
fatality incidents and an acknowledgment that "the way [bereaved] were
dealt with in the days and weeks following disaster [can have] as devastating
an effect as the facts of the deaths themselves."3 In 1999, the Chief Medical
Examiner for the State of Oklahoma wrote that the well-intentioned attempt
of funeral directors to keep loved ones from viewing victims of the Murrah
Building Bombing may have, for some people, "caused a significant delay in
3. Anne Eyre & Radford Semele, Improving Procedures and Minimising Distress:
Issues in the Identification of Victims Following Disasters, 17 AUSTL. J. EMERGENCY
MGMT. 9, 9 (2002).
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the grief processing,"4 because family members felt uncertain that the person
they buried was truly their relative.
A disaster resulting in a mass fatality can have profound emotional and
psychological effects, but it also can have tremendous legal consequences.
Taken singularly, death brings about a host of legal issues, including a
survivor's right to benefits or pensions, bank accounts, insurance
settlements, properties, business partnerships, creditor relationships, and
contractual obligations. Death and its legal consequences become more
complicated during a mass fatality event: body recovery is usually the last
phase of response, meaning that a victim's survivors can go weeks, months,
and occasionally years before remains are found, identified, and issued a
4. Fred Jordan, The Role of the Medical Examiner in Mass Casualty Situations with
Special References to the Alfred P. Murrah Building Bombing, 92 J. OKLA. STATE MED.
Ass'N 159, 163 (1999).
5. Id.
6. A disaster can also affect availability of funeral funds, which may be critical for
survivors facing catastrophic losses and unknown financial conditions. See, e.g., Disaster
Funeral Assistance Fact Sheet, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/
individual-assistance-program-tools/disaster-funeral-assistance-fact-sheet (last updated
July 14, 2012) (requiring death certificate to establish eligibility for funeral assistance).
7. Many times, a mass disaster can cause both mass casualties and mass fatalities.
A "mass casualty incident" includes injuries, and can result in a surge of injured
individuals that overwhelm emergency responders and healthcare infrastructure. A
"mass fatality" refers specifically to a large number of deaths.
8. Martha T. Moore, Remains Bring Hope, Frustration for 9/11 Families, USA
TODAY, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-04-19-remains
x.htm (noting that in 2006, excavators at the World Trade Center site uncovered more
remains from 9/11); see also John Bussey, Often the Dead are Never Found, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 5, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704587004576243
083745511592.html (stating that in 2011, officials still were not able to identify more
than 1,000 of the 2,752 people killed when the World Trade Center towers fell). One
notable exception to this tendency was Joplin, Missouri, which experienced a devastating
tornado in 2011. In spite of the tornado destroying hospitals and other critical
infrastructure, the 161 fatalities were handled speedily; by June 4, 2011, fatality
management operations ceased. The statuses of 268 individuals on a missing persons list
were confirmed in less than 2 weeks, although processing of remains and death
certificates took longer. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, THE RESPONSE TO THE
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death certificate. Depending on the type of incident, recovery and
identification of remains may simply be impossible. During this time,
survivors may be unable to begin administrative processes such as filing
insurance or benefits claims,9 because death certificates are often necessary
for "applying to various public agencies and private groups distributing
funds to the families . .. collecting life insurance proceeds," and the probate
process for wills.' 0  For survivors who depended solely on the deceased,
such a delay may impede delivery of important benefits necessary for
survivors' standard of living and even food security. Such instability further
adds to the trauma of losing a loved one.
Even before September 11, mass fatalities occurred often enough to raise
concerns about the ability of localities to promptly handle multiple deaths
where remains were unrecovered or unidentifiable. In 2000, following the
Alaska Airlines crash that killed 88 people, families of victims expressed
dismay at the delay in death certificates, stating that the crash "highlight[ed]
the need for federal legislation."' 1 As one family of the deceased stated,
9. This does not necessarily include insurance benefits, which will generally be
subject to contract law based on the terms of the original agreement between the
company and the insured. Most insurance companies require a death certificate before
filing a claim; however, private companies have discretion in this area. In the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, many companies implemented their own extraordinary measures. For
example, Phoenix Insurance Company established special procedures to expedite the
claims of those affected, most notably waiving the requirement of a death certificate to
begin claim processing. Instead, the company accepted other forms of proof of death.
Phoenix Establishes Special Procedures to Respond to Needs of Customers Affected by
September 11 Terrorist Attacks, PHOENIX, Sept. 17, 2001, http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97632&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=206956&highlight-. On
October 1, 2001, recognizing "the tremendous loss of life" and "the difficult
circumstances surrounding the recovery of the victims" of 9/11, Delaware's Department
of Insurance issued a bulletin requiring all insurers to accept "a fully executed affidavit in
the [specified] form . . . in lieu of a death certificate if such certificate is not available"
with respect to death claims arising out disaster at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon,
and the Pennsylvania Flight 93 crash site. Affidavit in Lieu of a Death Certificate for
Victims of the September 11 Disasters Involving the World Trade Center, the Pentagon
and Somerset County, Pa., BULL. 8 (Dep't of Ins., Del.), Oct. 1, 2001, available at
http://www.delawareinsurance.gov/departments/documents/bulletins/Bull8.pdf. Insurers
could use other information as well to process the claim, if they elected. Id.
10. Hirsh v. Frieden, 758 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
11. Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, Death Certificate Delays Add to Grief in Air Crashes,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, http://articles.latimes.com/2000/feb/16/news/mn-64804. At
the time, a report correctly stated that federal legislation mandating states to deliver death
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"[w]hen the world knows 217 people are dead and that there are no
survivors, why should their families have to wait" for their death
pronouncement? 12 In 2000, one attorney estimated that half of his airline
cases addressed complaints involving death certificates or recovery of
-13remains.
The unsatisfying answer is that mass fatalities complicate the issuance of
death certificates. They give rise to a myriad of legal concerns even without
the added uncertainty of unrecovered or unidentified remains.14 Mass
fatalities are usually part of a larger mass disaster, and the response depends
entirely on the type of incident. The incident triggering the mass fatality
deeply affects a number of issues, particularly body recovery and disaster
victim identification (DVI), key elements for issuance of a standard death
certificate.' 5
For example, an airplane crash typically has a very site-specific area, and
includes a flight manifest, making it easy to determine who was on board the
plane when it crashed.16 Responders can quickly evaluate if the response




14. The other concerns are outside the scope of this article, but include the "quasi-
property" right to the body and the right to bury the dead. See Boorman v. Nev. Mem'1
Cremation Soc'y, 236 P.3d 4, 6-10 (Nev. 2010) (citing Shults v. U.S., 995 F. Supp. 1270,
1275-76 (D. Kan. 1998) (construing that Mississippi law did not support a claim for
conversion and noting that "the partial remains of a human body[ ] has no compensable
value")); Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 882 (Colo. 1994) ("We
formally reject the fictional theory that a property right exists in a dead body that would
support an action for conversion."); Walser v. Resthaven, 633 A.2d 466, 477 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1993); see also World Trade Ctr. Families for Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of
New York, 567 F. Supp. 2d 529, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd, 359 Fed. Appx. 177 (2d Cir.
2009).
15. See Eyre & Semele, supra note 3.
16. Thomas J. Brondolo, Factors in Assessing Mass Fatality Incidents, IAEM BULL.
(Int'l Ass'n of Emergency Managers, N.Y.), Oct. 2006, at 12,
http://www.brondoloassociates.com/articleIAEMAssessingMFI.pdf (identifying five
factors that define a mass fatality: 1) the number of fatalities; 2) the rate of recovery; 3)
whether there is a manifest; 4) the condition of remains; and 5) jurisdiction of the
incident).
11I
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should be rescue, recovery, or both. Conversely, the attacks on the World
Trade Center were limited to a relatively dense geographic area, but the
number and identities of people affected were largely unknown. Employers
who worked in the World Trade Center were able to provide employee lists,
but given the commercial nature of the World Trade Center and the
surrounding areas, there was no definite way to account for people's
whereabouts.17
By contrast, it may take weeks to identify the extent of fatalities and
ensure recovery of the deceased in a more dispersed mass fatality event. For
example, after Hurricane Katrina, recovery and collection of remains in New
Orleans did not begin until nearly 10 days after the water breached the
levees and flooded the city. 8 Likewise, in Japan, when the 2011 earthquake
and tsunami struck, the nuclear radiation kept rescuers from starting
recovery efforts in the 12-mile area around the Fukushima power plant until
a month after the disaster. 19 Pandemics, such as the 1918 Spanish Flu are
often both geographically-dispersed and of long duration, creating difficult
fatality response and making recovery more difficult. 20
Pandemic flus, which often have high fatality rates, also highlight a final
complicating factor: the scale of events greatly impacts the recovery, or even
the ability to begin recovery. Mass disasters, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and the 2011 Japan earthquake and
tsunami were of such a scale that they destroyed or overwhelmed all local
17. Estimates for occupancy on September 11th were 17,400 tenants and visitors;
initial reports of missing persons went up to 20,000 people. James R. Gill, 9/11 and the
New York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner, 2 FORENSIC Sc., MED., & PATHOLOGY
29, 29-30 (2006). While this number was significantly narrowed, it demonstrates the
difficulty accounting for people in a highly trafficked, commercial area. See also In re
LaFuente, 743 N.Y.S.2d 678, 683 (2002); In re Philip, 851 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142-43 (2008).
18. New Orleans Begins Collecting Katrina's Victims, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 9,
2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9259667/ns/usnews-katrina-the longroadback/
t/new-orleans-begins-collecting-katrinas-victims/.
19. Hiroko Tabuchi, An Anniversary of 'Heartbreaking Grief in Japan, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/asia/a-year-later-effects-of-
japans-disaster-are-still-unfolding.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
20. JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE Epic STORY OF THE DEADLIEST
PLAGUE IN HISTORY 223, 326 (Penguin Books 2005).
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resources, effectively halting any functions, including recovery, for a
sustained period.21
Manmade or natural disasters that impact infrastructure and that require
first responders to focus on saving lives make body identification and body
recovery very difficult. Even when remains are found after a disaster, the
remains may be too small or compromised to provide DNA, or the deceased
may not have famil members or others able to aid in the victim
identification process. In some cases, it may not be possible to identify or
even find all remains. Building collapses, landslides, tsunamis, or similar
mass disasters often cause victims' bodies to be buried by debris.
Oftentimes, there is an urgency to dispose of dead bodies, usually out of a
fear that bodies pose a health risk. Although this concern is frequently
overstated, it remains pervasive.23 In mass fatalities that overwhelm and
incapacitate regions, survivors may handle bodies in the best way they know
how--often stacking bodies in a designated area or burying them in mass
24 . 25graves. Such conditions may speed deterioration or distort remains.
21 See, e.g., Simon Romero & Neil MacFarquhar, Haiti's Many Troubles Keep Bodies
Uncounted, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/2I/world/
americas/2 1 deathtoll.html.
22. See, e.g., World Trade Ctr. Families for Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York,
567 F. Supp. 2d 529, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd, 359 Fed. Appx. 177 (2d Cir. 2009)
(ruling on when remains are too small to provide DNA). However, in examining the
problem ofthe deceased lacking someone to aid in the victim identification process, New
Orleans is an instructive example.
23. J. Fisher, Water Sanitation Health: Disposal of Dead Bodies in Emergency
Conditions, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/watersanitation health/hygiene/
emergencies/deadbodies.pdf (last visited July 20, 2012) ("bodies are unlikely to cause
outbreaks of diseases . . . though they may transmit gastroenteritis or food poisoning
syndrome to survivors if they contaminate streams, wells, or other water sources."); see
Pan American Health Organization, Unseating the Myths Surrounding the Management
of Cadavers, DISASTER NEWSL., No. 93 (2003).
24. In the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, several mass graves were dug without
attempting any sort of identification. In the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, locals began
collecting and burying the dead themselves. While such actions are understandable, they
create a myriad of problems, as in addition to making identification difficult or
impossible, in the case of Haiti, it made an accurate account of the dead impossible. The
total count still varies widely, from conservative estimates of approximately 85,000 dead,
to the Haitian government's estimate of 300,000 dead. See Eyder Peralta, Report: Death
Toll of Haiti Much Lower Than Government Said, NPR.ORG (May 31, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/05/31/136832070/report-death-toll-in-haiti-
13
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The conditions of the remains will have a time-multiplying effect:
fragmented remains, such as those often associated with bombs, must each
26be treated as a separate individual. For example, in 1998, rescuers for the
crash of Swissair Flight 111 off the coast of Nova Scotia recovered only one
intact body; the rest of the 229 victims were recovered in approximately
15,000 pieces.27 Thus, even when responders make every effort to recover
remains, certain types of mass disasters make this practically impossible.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MASS FATALITY EVENTS
Generally, states and localities are responsible for the public health
concerns raised by mass fatality events, including handling and identifying
the remains. 28 The police power provides the states with broad authority to
pass and enforce laws to protect the public health and safety, including laws
that pertain to death or mass fatalities, such as those regarding transportation
and disposal of human remains, administration of vital records, and
earthquake-much-lower-than-government-estimates. In one particularly haunting
account, a community leader and surviving neighbors attempted to compile their own list
of the dead, estimating the earthquake killed a third of their community of 3,000. See
Simon Romero & Neil MacFarquhar, Haiti's Many Troubles Keep Bodies Uncounted,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/world/americas
/21deathtoll.html.
25. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many bodies were recovered in groups
that had been left vulnerable to the elements. Heat, water, and other factors may all cause
rapid deterioration, particularly when the disaster is of a nature that delays aid and
recovery workers, such as in the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Pandemics may produce similar
scenarios as well. See BARRY, supra note 20, at 326.
26. See Brondolo, supra note 16.
27. Dorothy Grant, Swissair Disaster Taught Medical Examiners a Lesson in
Logistical Challenges, 161 CANADIAN MED. Ass'N J. 743, 743 (1999), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1230633/pdf/cmaj_161_6_743.pdf
28. Generally, public health laws are reserved to the states via the Tenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, through the States' police power. U.S. CONsT. amend.
X; Tighe v. Osborne, 131 A. 801, 803 (Md. Ct. App. 1925). The police power is
generally defined as the "power inherent in the state to prescribe within the limits of the
federal and state constitutions reasonable regulations necessary to preserve the public
order, health, safety, or morals." Tighe, 131 A. at 803. The emphasis on state and local
government in emergency response also stems from general emergency management
principles that all disaster response begins locally and expands to state and federal levels.
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establishment of cemeteries and burial sites. States, in turn, have
traditionally delegated these roles to local medical examiners or coroners
(ME/C).30
In general, investigation and processing of a death, as well as custody of a
body, is under the jurisdiction of the ME/C where the death occurred. 3 1
Local ME/Cs usually have complete jurisdiction of a dead body. Control of
the body "extends from the scene of death, to transport from the scene of
death, investigation of death, and [ .. .] the right to release the body" when
the investigation is complete.32 If the body is unclaimed or unidentifiable,
the ME/C is responsible for storage and ultimate disposition of the
remains.33 Even though the World Trade Center attacks killed individuals
29. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Onieda-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 756 (1985) (noting that "[t]he States traditionally have had great latitude under their
police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons.")) (internal citations omitted); see also Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San
Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 366 (1910).
30. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-506 (2012) (outlining parameters
for "control of a body by a health officer").
31. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7102 (1965).
32. Michael Greenberger, Trudy Henson, Sean Kates, & Amy Major, Legal Issues in
Mass Fatality Events, in DEATH IN LARGE NUMBERS: THE SCIENCE, POLICY, AND
MANAGEMENT OF MASS FATALITY EVENTS 239, 244 (Elin A. Gursky & Marcella Farinelli
Fierro eds., American Medical Association 2012). See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7102 (1965) (stating that "in any case where a coroner is required by law to
investigate the cause of death, the coroner is entitled to the custody of the remains of the
person whose death is the subject of investigation until the conclusion of the autopsy or
medical investigation by the coroner."); see also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-309
(2008) (describing the duties of a medical examiner to include that "immediately on
notification that a medical examiner's case has occurred, the medical examiner or an
investigator of the medical examiner shall go to and take charge of the body."); MD.
CODE REGS. 10.35.01.20 ("the deputy medical examiner or forensic investigator shall
arrange for body transportation services of human remains from a scene of death in
Maryland to a specified location within Maryland.").
33. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7104(a) (stating: "[wihen no provision
is made by the decedent, or where the estate is insufficient to provide for interment and
the duty of interment does not devolve upon any other person residing in the state or if
such person cannot (sic) after reasonable diligence be found within the state the person
who has custody of the remains may require the coroner of the county where the decedent
15
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from nearly 30 different countries, the New York City Medical Examiner
retained jurisdiction over the bodies, and was responsible for identification
and issuance of death certificates for the 2,749 people killed.34 All
identification and processing of the remains was coordinated and executed
through that office.
While these public health activities typically reside with the state, the
federal government has provided guidance and aid. On occasion, the federal
government has issued mandates regarding state and local emergency
preparedness, including mass fatality management and mass fatality
management plans. 3 6 These plans, while necessary, primarily focus on the
healthcare side of handling and storing bodies and almost universally leave
intact the roles and responsibilities traditionally assigned to coroners or
medical examiners. For example, California's Health and Safety Code
charges the local county coroner with all of the duties described in the
paragraph above.37  Its Mass Fatality Management Guide extends those
responsibilities, recognizing the independence of the county coroner in its
planning assumptions,38 even in incidents likely to involve regional or
federal partners. While California state coroners may assist county coroners
by taking control of the body for identification and disposal purposes, the
resided at time of death to take possession of the remains and the coroner shall inter the
remains in the manner provided for the interment of indigent dead.").
34. Gill, supra note 17, at 29-30.
35. Id.at29-31.
36. See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NAT'L RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (NRF) i (2008),
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf. The NRF is "a guide to how the
Nation conducts all-hazards response" and describes "specific authorities and best
practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to large-
scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters." Id. at i. The NRF also created
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) Annexes to address specific areas of concern. Of
particular relevance here, ESF #8, deals directly with Public Health and Medical
Services, and addresses, proper management of mass fatality incidents. See FED.
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NAT'L RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (NRF) ESF #8-7 (2008),
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-08.pdf.
37. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7102-7108.
38. CAL. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERV., THE CALIFORNIA MASS FATALITY
MANAGEMENT GUIDE: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CORONERS' MUTUAL
AID PLAN 26 (2007).
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final line of responsibility is always at the county level. 39 Even federally-
administered assistance, such as the Disaster Mortuary Operational
Response Teams (DMORT), recognizes this primacy. When a number of
New Orleans residents questioned inaccuracies on victims' death certificates
following Hurricane Katrina, they were told that death certificates were "the
responsibility of the Orleans parish coroner.,40
Taken singularly, unrecovered or unidentified remains may cause
problems, but in a mass fatality, these problems are multiplied, and the effect
is more than staggering statistics. A localized mass fatality can easily
produce more bodies in a day than a ME/C office may handle in a year.
Thus, local ME/Cs may become overwhelmed, even in large cities such as
New York City that process thousands of bodies every year. 4 1 The New
York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner annually processes about
5,000 bodies. The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center killed
approximately half that many people in one day. Only 288 intact bodies
were recovered; the rest were recovered as nearly 20,000 individual
42remains. Other major cities handling similar numbers of deaths per year
are frequently operating at capacity, therefore, a mass fatality could easily
overwhelm their resources.4 3  Such statistics imply that survivors who
3 9. Id.
40. Shaila Dewan, Bungled Records of Storm Deaths Renew Anguish, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2005, at 26. This arguably could have been less about recognizing local ME/Cs
primacy and more about avoiding blame.
41. Usually, the entire office performs approximately 5,500 autopsies a year. See
Gill, supra note 17, at 29.
42. Id. at 30. The OCME worked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, from September to
December, 16 hours a day, 7 days a week from December to February, and 8 hours a day,
7 days a week, through May 2002. Id
43. The Office of the Medical Examiner of Cook County processes approximately
5,000 bodies a year, but is at capacity for storage. OFF. MED. EXAM'R. COOK CNTY.,
http://www.cookcountygov.com/portal/server.pt/community/medicalexaminer,office-o
f/307/medicalexaminer,_office-of (last visited July 9, 2012). In comparison, the Los
Angeles County Department of Coroner accepts approximately 8,700 cases a year. L.A.
CNTY. DEP'T. CORONER, Los Angeles County Department of Corner Annual Report,
(2009), available at http://coroner.lacounty.gov/Docs/2009%2OAnnual%20Report
FINAL.pdf. Large city morgues may be capable of holding hundreds of bodies; but small
cities have a much smaller capacity. MARION CNTY. CORONER'S OFF., http://www.indy.
gov/eGov/County/Coroner/Pages/deathinvestigation.aspx (last visited July 9, 2012).
17
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depend on victims may have to wait months or years before receiving a
death certificate that will entitle them to essential benefits. In devastated
areas, such benefits may be the difference between having food on the table
or a roof over their heads.
III. DEATH CERTIFICATES, PRESUMED DEATH, AND SPECIFIC PERILS
Presumed death becomes more important when the nature of a disaster
delays recovery, as delayed recovery will inevitably delay Disaster Victim
Identification, and issuance of death certificates. Under normal
circumstances, the coroner or medical examiner will investigate the death, if
necessary, and issue a death certificate that identifies the time, date, and
cause of death.4 This death certificate is required for survivors to begin a
number of legal and administrative processes, including initiating will
probation, filing insurance claims, gaining access to or settling accounts, and
receiving other benefits.
Because of the legal implications surrounding death, states have long had
"presumptive death" provisions for issuing death certificates when a body is
not found. Presumptive deaths are "a determination by court of competent
jurisdiction that. . . a death . . has occurred or is presumed to have occurred,
but the body . .. has not been located or recovered."45 A presumptive death
certificate may be issued to a proper petitioner after a statutorily prescribed
period of time elapses. Because of the uncertainty surrounding a death
where the location of the body is unknown and the immense complexities
that can arise from an erroneous declaration of death, the waiting period for
a presumptive death certificate is lengthy and typically ranges from five to
seven years from the day the person was reported missing. Some states,
such as New York or Georgia, require less time (three and four years,
respectively).47 Others, like Maryland, do not establish a statutorily defined
period of time, but allow courts to determine if a presumptive death
48
certificate is appropriate based upon evidence presented by the petitioner.
44. See generally Eyre & Semele, supra note 3.
45. FL. ST. ANN. §382.012(l)(a) (West 2012).
46. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 12401 (West 2012).
47. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.7 (McKinney 2012); GA CODE ANN. §
53-9-1 (2011).
48. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-102 (Lexis 2012). Maryland and North
Carolina are the only states that do not define a specific period of time that must elapse
prior to the issuance of a presumptive death certificate.
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In addition to indicating the number of years a person must be missing
and the required level of proof (ranging from clear and convincing evidence
to circumstantial evidence), presumptive death statutes also usually specify
that "time of death" is considered to be at the end of the waiting period. A
person's time of death is presumed "to have occurred at the end of the period
unless there is evidence establishing that death occurred earlier." 49 Thus, for
example, in a state with a five-year waiting period, a person who was last
seen or heard from on January 1, 2012, would be declared dead January 1,
2017. This means that survivors would not be eligible for any benefits for
the five years that have Fassed, including any benefits that might arise from
the disappearance itself.
Many states will issue presumptive death certificates earlier than the
statutorily-defined period if the deceased was exposed to certain
circumstances. Known as "specific peril" statutes or clauses, these
provisions establish a judicial remedy for the next of kin by allowing a court
to issue a presumptive death certificate if appropriate.5 A petitioner can
present evidence to a judge that the deceased was exposed to a specific peril,
verify that the petitioner has made a diligent search and inquiry for the
absentee, and document these facts.52  The court will review the petition
against the statutorily defined standard of evidence53 and issue a
presumptive death certificate where appropriate. Delaware's presumption of
death statute with a specific peril clause is typical, stating in relevant part:
(a) When the death of a person or the date thereof is in issue, the
unexplained absence from the last known place of residence and
49. FL. STAT. ANN. § 5.171(c) (West 2012).
50. See Matter of Consentino, 177 Misc.2d 629, 631 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1998) (where a
missing firefighter's wife sought a determination that her husband died as of the date of
his disappearance because their family might be eligible for additional benefits). For
families of 9/11 victims, a date of death three years after 9/11 would negate eligibility for
9/11-specific disaster funds.
51. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1701 (2007).
52. See, e.g., Garden v. Garden, 7 Del. 574, 1863 WL 816 (Del. Super. Ct. 1863).
53. Burden of proof ranges from clear and convincing evidence to evidence making
death more probable than survival. Compare In re Philip, 851 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2008) (applying a "clear and convincing" standard with a New York court),
with Conservatorship of Geiger, 3 Cal. App. 4th 127 (Ct. App. 4th 1992) (shifting the
burden of proof to the opposing party once the prerequisites were proved "more likely
than not" in California.).
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the fact that the person has been unheard of for 7 years may be a
sufficient ground for finding that the person died 7 years after the
person was last heard of.
(b) The fact that a person was exposed to a specific peril of death
may be sufficient ground for finding that the person died less than
7 years after the person was last heard of.54
Typically, like procedures for presumption of death, specific peril statutes
or clauses establish requirements for diligent search and inquiry, standards
of evidence, and time of death declarations. Unlike the typical presumption
of death statute, however, specific peril statutes usually declare death of the
absentee at the time of the specific peril or the day the absentee was last seen
or heard from, rather than at the end of the period. Such a distinction can
have a tremendous impact on survivors' access to benefits.
While presumptive death certificates and specific peril clauses are
effective measures against occasional cases of unrecovered remains, they
usually place a significant administrative burden on both petitioners and
governments that may be impractical in a mass disaster. For example, in
New York, the absentee's next of kin must file a petition with the court for a
declaration and submit supporting documentation of the search for the
absentee.ss Courts must adjudicate the matter and often must submit
paperwork to other agencies, such as the ME/C office or count registrar.
Additionally, public notice of the declaration is often required. Periodic
airplane crashes had already brought the significant administrative burden to
the attention of several states; however, the attacks on September 11
changed all of this.
IV. EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES: TEMPORARY LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Prior to 9/11, many states did not have specific peril statutes or clauses in
their presumptive death statutes, although some states recognized the
remedy in common law. Although many states now recognize specific
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.
55. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.7.
56. See id.
57. See supra discussion in section 1.
58. See infra, note 62.
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peril in common law,59 the statutes standardize and codify the practice,
alleviating the need for lengthy adjudication for each case. 60 States that did
have specific peril statues were typically coastal with heavy maritime
activity or experienced frequent natural disasters, such as California.
Mass fatalities were not originally contemplated as a "specific peril"
under these statutes. Some exceptions exist: in 1985, West Virginia enacted
a disaster-specific statute relating to presumptive deaths from severe
flooding. However, such events were too irregular for most states to
codify mass fatalities more generally, and manmade or terrorist events were
not contemplated as a "specific peril." Immediately after 9/11, however,
those states most heavily affected-New York, New Jersey, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania-recognized an overwhelming need to accelerate required
procedures for obtaining a death certificate. Several years later, after
Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana found itself reacting to a similar problem with
a familiar solution.
A. Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New Jersey
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New Jersey acted quickly to enact temporary
statutes that loosely followed the "specific peril" model, although each state
had variations that were later followed by other states. 62  For example,
Pennsylvania, the crash site of United Airlines Flight 93, amended its
presumptive death statute one month after 9/11 to include the terrorists
attacks, stating that the attacks "constitute specific perils within the meaning
59. See, e.g., Garden v. Garden, 7 Del. 574, at 1863 WL 816, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct.
1863); see also New Jersey, discussed infra note 60.
60. New Jersey, which amended its statute after 9/11, stated that the amendment
"provide[d] essentially for a statutory finding of 'specific peril,"' and stated that while
New Jersey courts had the authority to apply the specific peril doctrine, "now is an
appropriate time to ensure uniform application under these and similar circumstances."
The bill also clarified that nothing in the new language was meant to limit or abrogate the
common law specific peril doctrine. S. 20, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2001), available at
ftp://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2000200 1/S0500/20_II.PDF.
61. See W. VA. CODE § 44-9-lb (2007) ("a person last seen at any site within the area
proclaimed by the governor [on November 5th, 1985] to be in a state of emergency as a
result of the flooding in this state ... and whose body has not been found or identified ...
shall. . . be presumed in law to be dead[.]").
62. See 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701, 5706 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. §
64.1-105 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:27-l(b) (West 2012).
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of section 5701(c) (relating to proof of death) which would justify a court to
immediately determine that the presumed decedent died on September 11,
2001."63
Virginia took a different approach by passing a "9/11 exception" to its
64seven-year presumptive death statute. The exception was specific to
documented victims in the Pentagon disaster or on the plane flown into the
65Pentagon, whose bodies have not been found or identified. Interestingly,
Virginia was the only state responding to 9/11 to require a waiting period for
the issuance of death certificates, although the waiting period was only three
months.66
Although New Jersey recognized specific peril in its common law
doctrine, it amended its presumptive death statute by providing that "a
resident or nonresident of New Jersey who is exposed to a specific event
certified by the Governor as a catastrophic event that has resulted in a loss of
67life" was presumed dead. The statute was passed less than a month after
September 11, which the Governor declared a "catastrophic event," and
made retroactive to that date.68 The statute itself also allowed for a judicial
decree from the Superior Court of a presumptive death, if it concluded "from
a review of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that the earlier
death [. . . ] has been established."69 The bill also allowed the Attorney
General to initiate or intervene in any proceedings under the "catastrophic
event" presumed death process. 70  This forward-looking provision
anticipated a model many states would later emulate.
63. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701, 5706.
64 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-105.
65. Id.; see also H.B. 489/S.B. 575 2002, available at http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-
bin/legp604.exe?02 I +sum+HB489S.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-105; see also H.B. 489/S.B. 575 2002, available at
http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?021+sum+HB489S. The waiting period may
have been because of the delay, as that period would have passed almost as soon as the
9/11 exception passed.
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:27-1(b) (West 2012).
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1. New York
Faced with the largest mass fatality in U.S. history and a tremendous
recovery process, New York immediately recognized the difficult and
lengthy recovery it was facing. Although recovery of the remains would
take much longer, the attacks on the World Trade Center produced
approximately half of New York City's annual fatalities in one day.7' The
state used two mechanisms to issue presumptive death certificates. The first
of these measures was already codified in a specific peril amendment known
as EPTL 2-1.7.72 EPTL 2-1.7 allowed death to be established "in less than
three years, if clear and convincing evidence indicates the most probable
date of death." 73 Exposure to a specific peril was a sufficient basis for that
determination. 7 4 A new amendment effective August 2000, EPTL 2-1.7(b)
was itself an outgrowth of the TWA Flight 800 crash in 1996, which killed
230 people.75 Search and rescue could not locate the crash site; based on the
flight manifest, the county ME/C issued death certificates for those on-board
the flight in spite of their unrecovered bodies.7 6
However, EPTL 2-1.7 required certain administrative processes, such as
running notice in newspapers ads, which officials knew were impracticable
after 9/11.7 Therefore, New York City officials employed a novel approach
71. The New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiners (OCME) performs
approximately 5,500 autopsies a year. Of the 2,749 people killed, only 288 intact bodies
were recovered; the rest of the remains were recovered in nearly 20,000 individual
pieces. The OCME worked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, from September to
December; 16 hours a day, 7 days a week from December to February; and 8 hours a day,
7 days a week, through May 2002. Gill, supra note 17, at 29. By October 2002, 1,432
victims had been identified; by September 2005, 58% of the 2,749 people missing had
been identified. 1,152 remains could not be identified. Id.
72. N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.7.
73. Id
74. Id. at § 2-1.7(b).
75. Wallace L. Leinheardt, Special Procedures for Victims of the World Trade
Center Tragedy Provide Expedited Access to Assets, 73 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 8 (2001). TWA
Flight 800 is the third-deadliest aviation crash in a U.S. territory.
76. Id.
77. For example, presumptive death certificates required posting notice for four
weeks, as in a newspaper. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.7(b).
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to help ease the administrative burden of issuing presumptive death
certificates for missing persons. The Medical Examiner of New York City
brought a summary action against the Commissioner of Health, requesting a
declaratory judgment that would allow the ME's office to conclude a
78missing person had died in the attacks. A victim's next of kin could
79submit an affidavit and supporting documents about the missing person.
The ME would employ a three-pronged evidentiary approach for
determining, based on the next of kin's submission, whether the victim's
disappearance was sufficient for filing a death report.80 The three prongs
were: 1) establishing the identities of the missing person and the person
seeking a death certificate, as well as the requesting person's relationship to
the missing person; 2) clearly connecting the missing person to the World
Trade Center; and 3) confirming the missing person's continuing absence.81
This alleviated the need for adjudication of each absentee/missing person
and allowed the city to "achieve two seemingly incompatible objectives-
speedy relief and a prudent adjudicating mechanism." 82 Petitioners who did
not meet the three-pronged approach could appeal the decision.
By late October, less than two months after the attacks, 1,860 applications
for expedited death certificates were received, and 1,641 had been
resolved. Eventually, 2,400 presumptive death certificates were issued by
judicial decrees; about half of these were later changed to traditional death
certificates when remains were identified.84 The Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner (OCME) noted that "the use of legal statutes allowed the prompt
issuance of death certificates, which benefit surviving family members."
One OCME official noted "to have delayed issuing death certificates until all
78. Hirsh v. Frieden, 758 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 789; see also Gill, supra note 17, at 31.
81. Hirsh, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 758; see also Gill, supra note 17, at 31.
82. Hirsh, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
83. Leinheardt, supra note 75.
84. Gill, supra note 17, at 31.
85. Id. at 32.
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of the DNA testing had been completed would have resulted in more than
1,000 families waiting for more than 1 year to receive a death certificate."86
Although some officials were concerned that the procedure would cause
confusion or be susceptible to abuse, these concerns went largely unfounded.
The court itself cited "relatively few applications (approximately 50) [that]
proved to be a sham or a mistake." There were, however, limits to New
York City's expedited process. The procedures did not cover out-of-
wedlock relationships, divorced parents of minors who would become
guardian of the minor, and next of kin whose loved one was not regularly
employed but "might have been at the World Trade Center" at the time of
88attack. Furthermore, executors who were not next of kin were not eligible
for the expedited process.89 However, those who were not eligible for the
expedited death certificates could still use the procedures outlined in EPTL
2-1.7(b).
New York courts adjudicated only a handful of appeals for expedited
death certificates. The cases comprised what one court referred to as cases
that did not meet the evidentiary standards but "appear[ed] to have a ring of
truth" to them.90 Almost all of the cases centered on the sufficiency of proof
connecting the missing person to the World Trade Center.91 While the
number is relatively low, one case where a petitioner was denied a
86. Id. at 31. While death certificates can ease survivors' concerns, presumptive
death certificates create their own worries: "There was concern that family members
might mistakenly believe that if an affidavit death certificate was issued, a diligent
pursuit for the identification of the remains would stop." Id. Communication and time
proved the OCME's dedication to identification. Id.
87. Hirsh, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
88. Leinheardt, supra note 75, at 9.
89. Id.
90. Hirsh, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
91. See In re LaFuente, 743 N.Y.S.2d 678, 683 (2002) (finding evidence that
commuter who often attended conferences in the World Trade Center and had told
coworker that he would be attending a conference that morning "clearly indicates
absentee was in the immediate vicinity of the World Trade Center, and in all likelihood,
in the North Tower when the first airliner struck"); In re Philip, 851 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142-
43 (2008) (holding that circumstantial evidence, habit, and physician-wife's
predisposition to help others met evidentiary standard by showing her presence at the
World Trade Center was "highly probable.").
25
26 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXIX: 1
presumptive death certificate was overturned in 2008-seven years after it
was originally filed.9 2  By comparison, the typical presumption-of-death
waiting period would have been as long, and the wait was four years longer
than in New York.93
V. A POST-9/1 1 WORLD: OTHER STATES' STATUTORY RESPONSE TO MASS
FATALITIES
9/11-related statutes were extraordinary, event-specific, and temporary.
Although New York was proof that reactionary procedures could prove
effective, after 9/11, states began to recognize that "there are circumstances
in which an individual's death is virtually certain. In such circumstances,
the requirement that the administration of the individual's estate be
suspended [ . . . ] seems both unnecessarily harsh and unrealistic." 94 As one
commentator put it, "the reality is that, for some persons, the fact of the
absence suggests the exposure to the specific peril." 9 5 In those situations,
five-year or seven-year waiting periods might pose hardships on surviving
family.96 A spate of states amended their presumptive death or specific peril
statutes; most were directly attributed to the issues arising from 9/11 and
"the registration of death certificates for individuals for which no body is
found.", 7 These post-9/11 amendments represent an important step in the
92. In re Philip, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43.
93. See generally id. at 141. See also In re Application of Gartner, No. 330585 (Sur.
Ct. Nassau Cnty. Sept. 28, 2004) (declining a petition to find absentee exposed to specific
peril of 9/11, but declaring absentee dead as of September 11, 2004, where distinction
would particularly affect petitioner's ability to receive 9/11-specific relief funds and
benefits.).
94. Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and Fiduciary Administration,
55 MERCER L. REv. 459, 479 (2003).
95. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.7 (Supplementary Practice
Commentaries).
96. See, e.g., Presumptive Death Law, Catastrophic Events or Disasters and
University of Kansas Hospital Authority Amendment: Hearing on H.B. 2733 and H.B.
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evolution of mass fatality and presumptive death certificates.
Amendments followed two typical models: either adding specific peril
clauses to existing presumptive death statutes, or creating new statutes that
not only addressed specific perils, but exclusively dealt with mass fatalities.
A. Simple Math: Georgia, Florida, and the Addition of Specific Peril
The simplest amendments added specific peril clauses to existing
presumptive death statutes. Georgia is an example of one of these states. At
the time, it required a statutory waiting period of four years. Alternatively, a
twelve month period is available if death of the absentee is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. 99 After 9/11, the state recognized that in
times when "an individual's death is virtually certain," the delay of
administering an estate seemed "both unnecessarily harsh and unrealistic." 00
Georgia amended its statute to allow an individual's death to be proven at
any time. To do so, a petitioner needed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the absentee was "exposed to a specific peril or tragedy
resulting in probable death."' 0' Florida took a similar approach and
amended its presumptive death statute to allow "evidence showing that the
absent person was exposed to a specific peril of death" as "a sufficient basis
for the determining at any time after such exposure that he or she died less
than 5 years after the date on which his or her absence commenced."l 02 In
2003, Virginia amended its "9/11 exception" to a more generic "specific
peril of death" clause. 0 3
Four years after 9/11, Louisiana, which had not changed its statute after
9/11, was struck by Hurricane Katrina and found itself facing a mass fatality
incident with an additional complication-a city whose vital and criminal
records were destroyed. The state recognized the need to expedite
presumptive death certificates but was aware that opportunists might use
98. Another avenue of emergency relief for mass fatalities lies with the governor of a
state. See infra, note 114.
99. See GA CODE ANN. § 53-9-1(a)-(b) (2011).
100. Radford, supra note 94, at 479.
101. GA CODE ANN. § 53-9-1(d) (2012).
102. 2003 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 924 (2012).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-105 (2007); see also J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts,
and Estates, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 287, 299 (2003).
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simplified procedures and destroyed records to commit fraud or avoid debt
or prison sentences.1 04 The amended provision reflects this concern and
states that a person whose "absence commenced between August 26, 2005,
and September 30, 2005, and was related to or caused by Hurricane Katrina
or Rita" and who was "not currently charged with an offense that is defined
as a felony under the laws of the state of Louisiana or the United States of
America shall be presumed dead after the passage of two years.""os The
statute and the unusual waiting period of two years also acts as a tacit
recognition of the chaotic nature of the city's evacuation and response,
which left Louisiana citizens displaced in states as far away as Maryland and
New York.
B. Tying to Catastrophic Disasters
These relatively simple amendments reflected the sea change in the
relationship between disaster and mass fatalities brought about by 9/11. In
reality, however, changes such as those implemented by Georgia or Florida
only aligned those states with New York's EPTL 2-7.1, or, like New Jersey,
codified common law principles. The more typical state response after 9/11
was to amend its statutes to contemplate a catastrophic event or disaster.
These statutes not only recognized the potential for mass fatalities resulting
in unrecovered remains, but also sought to establish procedures that
recognized the incident's larger context, often tying presumption of death to
catastrophic events and providing alternate approaches for the issuance of
the certificates.
In 2002, Kansas updated its laws by amending its presumption of death
statutel06 to include absentees "missing as a result of a catastrophic event or
disaster," pursuant to its newly-passed §59-2708, which mimicked New
York's expedited death certificate procedures: 0 7
104. This is a common concern with presumptive death certificates, given the legal
importance of death and its effect on the distribution of a decedent's estate.
105. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 54 (2011).
106. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2704, -2708 (West 2005).
107. The legislature was clear that the bill's development was in response to 9/11,
which caused "most state registrars of vital statistics to review their state laws in light of
the exigencies that emerged in New York." Supplemental Notes, H.B. 2733 (2002),
available at http://www.kansas.gov/government/legislative/supplemental/2002/
SN2733.pdf.
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(2) An absentee shall be presumed dead immediately after the
catastrophic event if:
(A) The absentee's body could not be recovered due to the
nature of the catastrophic event; and
(B) evidence presented to a court of proper jurisdiction places
the absentee at the site of the catastrophic event on the date
and at the time of the event. 0 8
In 2003, Texas passed a statute for issuing a certificate of death by
"catastrophe," 109 defined as "the occurrence of a substantial force that causes
widespread or severe damage, injury, or loss of life or property and from
which it is not reasonable to assume that a person could survive."'' 0 A list
of examples includes natural disasters, explosions, and airplane crashes."'
The statute describes the process for the issuance of a presumptive death
certificate, requiring an affidavit and a brief waiting period of 10 days.112
One forward-looking component of the statute, like New Jersey's, is that it
allows an affiant for the certificate to be the next of kin or an "agent of a
government authority that conducts a search" for the missing person and has
concluded that search. 3
Other states took a different approach, intrinsically tying the ability to
issue a presumptive death certificate in a catastrophic disaster to a
Governor's proclamation. In a state of declared emergency, most governors
have the power to suspend laws and regulations as needed to manage a
disaster, which could include those laws and regulations relating to deaths,
death certificates, and presumed death certificates.' 14
For example, in 2002, Kentucky, which has a 7-year statutory period for
presumption of death, adopted a separate statute regarding presumptive
108. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2708 (West 2012).
109. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 193.010 (West 2012).
110. Id. § 193.010(a).
111. See id. § 193.010(a)(1)-(3).
112. See id § 193.010(b).
113. Id. § 193.010(b)(2).
114. See, e.g, TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 418.011-418.024 (West 2012); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 29-a (McKinney 2012); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 3305/7 (2012); FLA.STAT.
ANN. § 252.36 (West 2012); LA.REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:724 (2012).
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deaths following a catastrophic event.' 15 "Following a catastrophic event,"
presumptive death certificates can be issued when a Govemor-certified
catastrophic event has occurred, led to loss of life, and diligent search and
inquiry fails to find the missing person."' 6 The statute allows an applicant to
receive a death certificate (that may indicate it was issued via court order)." 7
It also allows for the Attorney General to "initiate or intervene in any
proceedings or action brought" pursuant to the declaration of death in a
catastrophic event." 8
Oregon adopted a similar statute, expanding a catastrophe to include "a
natural disaster or an act of war, terrorism or sabotage" that "has caused the
death of unknown persons on a specific date at a specific place."" 9 For any
civil or administrative proceeding, a missing person is presumed dead if it is
shown that the missing person was "at or near the place described in a
proclamation," on the specified date, and that the absence "cannot be
satisfactorily explained after diligent search."l20 In addition, "the court may
enter an order directing the State Medical Examiner to deposit a death
certificate with the county registrar for a decedent presumed to be dead
under this section" for administering the absentee's estate. 12 The statute is
not meant to limit or abrogate the state's common law special peril
doctrine,122 which would presumably still be available for persons missing-
presumed-dead, or death arising from non-catastrophic events.
C. California: The Comprehensive Disaster Model
The aforementioned statutes codify procedures similar to those used in
New York following 9/11. The statutory evolution of presumptive death and
specific peril statutes helped ease the emotional and legal burdens of mass
115. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.130,422.132 (West 2012).
116. Id. § 422.132(1), (3).
117. Id. § 422.132(3).
118. Id. § 422.132(4).
119. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 176.740(1) (West 2012).
120. Id. § 176.740(2)(a)-(b).
121. Id. §176.740(3).
122. Id. §176.740(4)
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fatality incidents and help ensure benefits reach survivors in a more efficient
manner. Such statutes' efficacy relies in large part on administrative
efficiency, which cannot always be assumed in a mass disaster. Allowing
alternative methods to initiate the application for presumptive death
certificates (such as the Governor, Attorney General, or agent of a
government agency) addresses some of these administrative concerns. Few
statutes, however, address the administrative burden on the person ultimately
responsible for the death certificates-the ME/C. California, which has a
five-year presumption of death period, 12 3 has comprehensively addressed
mass fatalities statutorily. The result alleviates not only the emotional and
legal burdens on family members and officials, but also creates a
streamlined process for ME/Cs as well.
While California has a typical presumption of death statute,' 24 it has
developed a specific, parallel process for mass fatalities. The processes are
similar to those used by certain municipalities. For instance, the Ventura
County Board of Supervisors in California voted to petition the Superior
Court to issue a declaration that victims of the Alaska Airlines crash were
deceased,125 and the Rhode Island Attorney General issued a similar petition
to a court after the 1999 EgyptAir crash, requesting presumptive death
certificates be issued to waiting relatives.126
California's Health and Safety Code is one of the few that specifically
contemplates mass fatalities. It defines mass fatality incidents as those
where "there are more dead bodies than can be handled using local
resources," numerous persons are known to have died, but bodies are
irrecoverable, or recovery and identification is "impracticable or
impossible."1 2 7 The county ME/C is authorized to "make the determination"
that such a mass fatality condition exists.128 Additionally, California Health
123. CAL. PROB. CODE § 12401 (West 2012).
124. Id. ("In proceedings under this part, a person who has not been seen or heard
from for a continuous period of five years by those who are likely to have seen or heard
from that person, and whose absence is not satisfactorily explained after diligent search
or inquiry, is presumed to be dead. The person's death is presumed to have occurred at
the end of the period unless there is sufficient evidence to establish that death occurred
earlier.").
125. Nelson, supra note 11.
126. Id.
127. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 103451(a)(1)-(3) (West 2006).
128. Id. § 103451(b).
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and Safety Code § 103450 allows an ME/C to submit a petition for death
certificates for a list of victims rather than having to file individual petitions:
In the event of a mass fatalities incident, a single verified petition
with respect to all persons who died may be filed by a coroner or
medical examiner with the clerk of the superior court in and for
the county in which the mass fatalities incident occurred for an
order to judicially establish the fact of, and the time and place of,
each person's death . . .129
Furthermore, the ME/C is authorized to determine when these measures
are necessary. Sections (b) and (c), which address these administrative
issues, were added in 2002130 via a bill acknowledging both 9/11 and
California's recent airplane crash: "both the events of September 11th and
the Alaskan Airlines crash highlight the challenges grieving families face in
obtaining a death certificate following a tragic loss of a loved one whose
body cannot be recovered."13 1
VI. CONCLUSION
The statutory evolution of the 2000s shows the varied ways to respond to
a mass fatality and presumptive death certificates. While New York and
other states, such as Louisiana, acted quickly after mass disasters to
implement temporary fixes that worked well, such fixes require an adaptive
and operating legislature and government-something that cannot always be
assumed during mass disaster planning. Thus, putting such measures "on
the books" will help ease legal uncertainty and ensure that measures are
properly executed with minimal delay. States that have yet to amend their
presumption of death statutes to include specific perils such as mass
disasters or catastrophic deaths should do so with all deliberate speed and
include measures in those statutes that address administrative concerns.
Additionally, the U.S. should continue its forward-looking approach to
help address international mass fatalities abroad. The international
community began a discussion in earnest after the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami, because tens of thousands of European nationals were vacationing
129. Id. § 103450(c).
130. Hearing on A.B. 1872 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Health, 2002 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2002).
13 1. Id.
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in the area where the tsunami struck.132 In 2007, the Council of Europe133
concluded:
[D]ue to unprecedented mobility caused by the development of
travel and prolongation of stays in foreign countries, as well as the
increased risk and occurrence of terrorist attacks and manmade or
natural disasters, due among other things to climate change, there
is a need to supplement and, where legislation already exists, to
further harmonise [sic] the legislation in member states on the
presumption of death of missing persons.' 34
The Council of Europe then laid out its 2007 Recommendations on
Principles Concerning Missing Persons and the Presumption of Death,
which provided procedures for managing the resolution of issues associated
with missing persons and the issuance of death certificates.' 35  The
recommendations were incorporated in the Athens Convention' and were
132. Risk Management Solutions, Estimating Losses from the 2004 Southeast Asia
Earthquake and Tsunami, RMS SPECIAL REPORT 6 (2005); see also Rebecca Ellen, The
Victorian Response to the Tsunami Disaster in Thailand 2004/2005: A Personal Account,
3 VICTORIAN INST. FORENSIC MED. 15, 17-18 (2005) (finding that nearly eight months
after the tsunami struck, 1,500 bodies remained at one mortuary site and that disaster
victim identification was more difficult than usual because the tsunami had removed the
clothing, jewelry, and other key personal effects that are often used to help identify the
deceased); see also Yoko Nishikawa, Quake-Ravaged Japan Digs Mass Graves,
REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.reuters.comi/article/2011/03/23/us-japan-graves-
idUSTRE72M1JE20110323 (stating that five years after the tsunami, unclaimed bodies
remained in chillers, and 370 unidentified bodies were buried in a nearby plot, while the
U.S. and other countries secured a Thai government guarantee that remains of foreign
victims would not be buried without identification).
133. The Council of Europe is composed of forty-seven countries. See Eur. Consult.
Ass'n, Recommendations on Principles Concerning Missing Persons and the
Presumption of Death 4 (2009), http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=47pays 1
europe&l=en.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id.
136. Convention Relating to the Establishment of Death in Certain Cases, Sept. 14,
1966, ICCS No. 10, http://www.ciecl.org/Conventions/Conv10Angl.pdf. The
Convention had a number of signatory-states, and contained provisions about a
declaration of death where a person is missing but death is certain. It was used
successfully by state signatories successfully for 9/11 cases where bodies were never
found, but those signatory's citizens were known to be at the World Trade Center at the
33
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officially released and adopted in 2009 to provide additional guidance for
missing persons where death is not certain.1
The Principles are relatively recent, and their efficacy in application to
international events remains untested. Furthermore, they do little to address
individual countries that are facing a mass fatality composed primarily of
their own citizens, such as the 2011 earthquake and tsunami Japan
experienced. Nine months after those disasters, the Wall Street Journal ran
an article highlighting the difficulty survivors faced as they attempted to
carry on family businesses, receive benefits, or resolve housing situations
where family members were missing but not confirmed dead.1 38 In June
2012, in order to "accommodate families of the missing," Japan's Justice
Ministry took "unusual steps" to simplify how missing persons would be
handled. Although Japan has a seven-year waiting period for presumed
death, or, in specific cases, one year, 139 "the Japanese government cut the
wait to three months from the time a person is declared missing for tsunami
VtiS,,140victims."4
time of the attacks. However, the Convention had two main shortfalls that the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami highlighted: the Convention dealt primarily with maritime and
flight situations, and only addressed certain death. In situations such as the Indian Ocean
tsunami, application of the Athens Convention proved more difficult because in many
cases, death was not certain.
137. The Principles follow a time-differentiated model, employing a three-tiered
approach: immediate declaration where death is certain; a one-year wait period where
death is probable; and a five-year wait period where death is uncertain. The certificate of
presumed death may be issued by a competent authority in one of three places: where the
missing person was a national, domiciled, or a habitual resident; where the missing
person was reported missing in the territory of that state; or where the vessel or aircraft
was registered, if the person went missing on a voyage. Either a person with a legitimate
interest or an authority designated by the state may make the request for declaration of
death. Convention Relating to the Establishment of Death in Certain Cases, supra note
136; see also Eur. Consult. Ass'n, supra note 133.
138. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Japanese in Legal Limbo Over Missing, WALL ST. J., Oct.
11, 2011, at Al3. In the three hardest-hit prefectures, more people were missing-
presumed-dead, than were confirmed dead. See also Chiyomi Sumida, Massive Search
by U.S., Japanese Troops Wraps Up with 339 Bodies, Stars and Stripes, Apr. 4, 2011,
http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/earthquake-disaster-in-japan/massive-search-by-u-s-
japanese-troops-wraps-up-with-339-bodies-found-1.139985.
139. Wakabayashi, supra note 138, at A13.
140. Id.
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Mass fatalities, whether manmade or natural, present a wrong for which
there can be no remedy. While it is true that "no matter the authority or
power"l 41 of a court, it cannot bring back lost loved ones; therefore, the use
of presumptive death and specific peril statutes will help ease the difficulties
survivors face.
141. World Trade Ctr. Families for Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F.
Supp. 2d 529, 542-543 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2009).
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